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Vegetating	Life	and	the	Spirit	of	Modernism		
in	Kafka	and	Beckett	
Modernism/modernity,	John	Hopkins	University	Press	(post-print	version)			At	 an	 acute	 theoretical	 level,	 belatedness	 and	 recommencement	 are	 inherent	 to	modernism’s	pursuit	of	the	now	and	the	new.	As	an	artistic	sensibility	dedicated	to	the	ephemeral	 and	 elusive	 flux	 of	 modernity,	 modernism	 can	 be	 conceived	 as	 a	contradictory	 spirit	 that	 enacts	 an	 auto-defeating	 and	 therefore	 auto-sustaining	 rapid	cycle	 of	 attempt	 and	 failure,	 purpose	 and	 obsolescence.	 In	 this	 essay	 I	 argue	 that	 the	unachievable,	 self-perpetuating	 aspiration	 that	 modernism	 contains	 is	 refigured	 as	despondent,	 late	modern	 ‘vegetating	 life’	 in	 the	works	 of	 two	 limit-modernists,	 Franz	Kafka	and	Samuel	Beckett.	Despite	producing	 the	bulk	of	 their	most	memorable	work	over	30	years	apart,	both	Kafka	and	Beckett	repeatedly	offer	comparable	expressions	of	endlessness	–	through	purgatorial	narrative	conditions	encapsulated	by	the	continuous	recontextualization	of	deictic	 language	–	that	resonate	with	the	 inevitable	belatedness	and	 creative	 recommencement	 of	 modernism.	 Although	 deictic	 language	 is	 not	especially	frequent	in	Kafka	or	Beckett,	it	acquires	great	significance	in	their	evocations	of	‘vegetation’,	an	underexplored	state	identified	by	critics	such	as	Georg	Lukács,	Walter	Benjamin	 and	Theodor	Adorno	 that	 encompasses	 a	 series	 of	 related	binaries:	 activity	and	stasis,	desire	and	passivity,	life	and	death.	In	Kafka’s	proto-form	and	Beckett’s	later-form,	 each	 writer	 conveys	 what	 Shane	 Weller	 calls	 the	 ‘paradoxical	 experience	 of	endless	ending,	an	experience	that	is	alien	to	the	Enlightenment	conception	of	progress	which	underlines	the	powerful	myth	of	modernity,	and	that	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	late	
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modernist	conception	of	history’.1	Through	portrayals	of	such	 interminable	vegetative	states,	 Kafka	 anticipates	 and	 Beckett	 epitomises	 a	 virtually	 exhausted	 late	modernist	life,	 undergoing	 the	 throes	 of	 modernism’s	 drive	 for	 novelty	 and	 immediacy	 while	subject	 to	 the	 pervasive	 negativity	 and	 failure	 that	 replaces	 the	 possibility	 of	achievement.	 If	modernism’s	 intrinsic	 tardiness	 fuels	 its	 invention	of	 ever-new	 forms,	the	 lateness	 in	 late	 modernism	 manifests	 as	 futility,	 burden	 and	 nostalgia.	 The	vegetating	 life	 evident	 narratively	 and	 linguistically	 in	 Kafka’s	 ‘The	 Hunter	 Gracchus’	(1917/1931)	and	Beckett’s	Texts	for	Nothing	(1950-51),	for	example,	demonstrates	the	purgatorial	 condition	of	modernism	habitually	 starting	anew	and	 converts	 it	 into	 late	modernism’s	protracted	ending.			
The	Spirit	of	Modernism		It	 is	 common	 for	 the	 critical	 distillation	 of	 discrepant	 modernisms	 to	 derive	 an	elemental	dynamic	spirit	 that	goes	back	 to	 its	etymological	 roots:	modern,	modo,	 ‘just	now’.	In	his	essay	‘Modernity:	An	Unfinished	Project’,	first	published	in	German	in	1981,	Jürgen	 Habermas	 portrays	 modernism	 as	 a	 persistent	 rebellion	 kicking	 against	 the	normative	past:	‘With	varying	content,	the	term	“modern”	again	and	again	expresses	the	consciousness	of	 an	epoch	 that	 relates	 itself	 to	 the	past	of	 antiquity,	 in	order	 to	 view	itself	 as	 the	 result	 of	 a	 transition	 from	 old	 to	 the	 new’.2	 As	 an	 agent	 of	 change,	modernism	 appears	 necessarily	 retrospective	 to	 legitimately	 and	 repeatedly	 disturb	sedimented	 cultural	 traditions.	 Likewise,	 in	 an	 earlier	 1967	 essay,	 ‘The	 Culture	 of	Modernism’,	Irving	Howe	discerns	the	intense	reactivity	of	modernism,	arguing	that	‘no	matter	what	impasse	it	encounters	in	its	clashes	with	the	external	world,	modernism	is	ceaselessly	 active	 within	 its	 own	 realm,	 endlessly	 inventive	 in	 destruction	 and	improvisation’.3	 Howe	 accentuates	 the	 energetic	 versatility	 of	 the	modernist	 spirit	 to	
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the	 point	 of	 infinitude,	 underlining	 its	 restless	 originality	 in	 defiance	 of	 shifting	historical	 contexts.	 More	 recently,	 Gabriel	 Josipovici	 summarises	 his	 book,	Whatever	
Happened	to	Modernism?	(2010),	with	the	claim	that	modernism	‘will	always	be	with	us,	for	 it	 is	not	primarily	a	 revolution	 in	diction,	or	a	 response	 to	 industrialisation	or	 the	First	 World	 War,	 but	 is	 art	 coming	 to	 a	 consciousness	 of	 its	 limitations	 and	responsibilities’.4	 Rather	 than	 a	 specific	 aesthetic,	 historical	 or	 ideological	understanding,	Josipovici	articulates	the	enduring	spirit	of	modernism:	a	diffuse	sense	of	modernist	art	as	an	aggressive,	resistant	dynamic.	His	present	tense	phrase,	‘coming	to’,	suggests	that	modernism	is	a	continual	process,	one	of	reflection	and	renewal.	Susan	Stanford	 Friedman	 describes	 such	 conceptions	 of	 ‘modern/modernity/modernism’	 as	the	 ‘relational	 definition’	 which	 ‘stresses	 the	 condition	 or	 sensibility	 of	 radical	disruption	 and	 accelerating	 change	 wherever	 and	 whenever	 such	 a	 phenomenon	appears,	 particularly	 if	 it	 manifests	 widely.	 What	 is	 modern	 or	 modernist	 gains	 its	meaning	 through	negation,	 as	 a	 rebellion	 against	what	once	was	or	was	presumed	 to	be’.5	 To	 extend	 this	 premise	 to	 its	 logical	 conclusion,	 the	 constant	 production	 of	 a	cultural	 past	 would	 guarantee	 that	 the	 spirit	 of	 modernism	 is	 always	 emergent	 and	potentially	limitless.		However,	 as	 early	 as	 1929,	 modernism’s	 knell	 was	 sounding.	 ‘Demands	 for	ceaseless	 artistic	 innovation	–	Pound’s	 injunction	 to	 “make	 it	new”	–	were	 starting	 to	sound	old’6;	an	editorial	in	The	Times	proclaimed	the	‘Eclipse	of	the	Highbrow’	in	1941,	opining	‘that	age	is	past,	though	some	of	its	ghosts	still	walk’7;	and	by	1955,	the	outright	‘Decline	 of	Modernism’	 had	 occurred:	 no	 longer	would	 arts	 be	 ‘brought	 down	 to	 the	level	of	esoteric	parlour	games’.8	Harry	Levin’s	1960	essay	‘What	Was	Modernism?’	and	Maurice	Beebe’s	1974	response	‘What	Modernism	Was’	both	reflected	on	modernism	in	the	past	tense,	able	to	define	a	bygone	art	with	more	 ‘detachment	and	objectivity’.9	 In	
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Howe’s	work	from	the	 late	1960s	and	early	70s,	modernism	is	addressed	as	a	waning	sensibility	suffering	an	undignified	demise	as	a	residual,	inauthentic	copy	of	the	radical.	Howe	 asserts	 that	 ‘there	 are	works	 in	which	 the	 outer	mannerisms	 and	 traits	 of	 the	modern	are	faithfully	echoed	or	mimicked	but	the	animating	spirit	has	disappeared—is	that	not	a	useful	shorthand	for	describing	much	of	the	“advanced”	writing	of	the	years	after	the	Second	World	War?’10	Similarly,	although	Habermas	recognises	modernity	as	an	 ‘unfinished	 project’,	 he	 also	 deems	 it	 a	 haunting	 semblance:	 ‘The	 impulse	 of	modernity	 […]	 is	 exhausted;	 anyone	who	 considers	 himself	 avant-garde	 can	 read	 his	own	death	warrant.	Although	 the	avant-garde	 is	still	 considered	 to	be	expanding,	 it	 is	supposedly	no	 longer	 creative.	Modernism	 is	dominant	but	dead’.11	 For	Peter	Bürger,	writing	 in	 1984,	 ‘newness’	 was	 always	 a	 characterisation	 of	modernism	 as	 a	 kind	 of	shallow	avant-gardism,	not	 false	 in	 its	 focus	on	 the	 intensely	experimental	per	 se,	 but	lacking	 the	 ‘criteria	 for	 distinguishing	 between	 faddish	 (arbitrary)	 and	 historically	necessary	newness’.12	Such	declarations	amount	to	a	‘declension	narrative’	that	attests	to	 how	modernism’s	 failsafe	 ethos	 of	 rupture	 and	 renewal	 has	matured	 into	 a	weary	historical	zeitgeist	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century.13	Its	fate	was	sealed	as	a	victim	of	inescapable	assimilation	according	to	Stanford	Friedman,	who	recognises	‘the	impossibility	of	perpetual	disruption	or	revolution	as	change	becomes	institutionalized.	What	begin	as	multiple	acts	of	rebellion	against	prevailing	hegemonies	become	through	their	 very	 success	 a	 newly	 codified,	 often	 commodified	 system’.14	 By	 virtue	 of	 its	reactivity	 to	 the	 normative,	 however,	 the	 bizarre	 suspicion	 remains	 that	 a	 brand	 of	fundamentalist	modernism	is	able	to	deal	with	itself,	or	previous	iterations	of	itself,	as	the	 status	 quo.	 Indeed,	 modernism	 can	 promise	 a	 paradoxical	 form	 of	 survival	 by	committing	suicide	or	performing	a	self-conducted	post-mortem.	Twenty-first	century	critical	studies	on	modernism’s	 ‘futures’	and	‘legacies’	 in	post-1945	and	contemporary	
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literature	give	credence	 to	 its	potential	 to	continue	as	a	sensibility	 that	outlives	 itself,	either	as	a	revived	prospect	or	inherited	past.15	It	is	apparent	from	this	brief	overview	that	the	historical	decline	of	modernism	is	in	conflict	with	the	enduring	spirit	of	modernism	as	a	reactive,	resistant	sensibility.	The	very	 notion	 of	 decline	 seems	 anathema	 to	 modernism	 as	 ‘a	 drama	 of	 perpetual	remaking’,	best	understood	as	‘a	performative	process	rather	than	a	means	to	an	end’.16	However,	 these	 contradictory	 narratives	 –	 one	 of	 constant	 renewal,	 one	 of	 gradual	decline	 –	 reveal	 the	 possibility	 of	 detecting	 a	 confluence	 of	 activity	 and	 stasis,	 or	 an	enlivening	 and	 deadening	 duality,	 in	 the	 inveterate	 spirit	 of	 modernism.	 Without	 a	teleological	trajectory,	modernist	art	 is	condemned	to	immediacy,	turning	over	voided	products	and	restored	purpose	 in	a	state	of	perpetual	belatedness,	 that,	when	viewed	panoramically,	 appears	 to	 have	 stagnancy	 engrained	 in	 its	 very	 flux.	 As	 Stanford	Friedman	 expresses:	 ‘Like	 the	 noun	 modernity,	 the	 adjectival	 form	 slips	 and	 slides	between	meanings	 rooted	 in	 the	possibility	 and	 impossibility	of	 “making	 it	new”’.17	A	double	 take	 on	 Habermas’s	 and	 Howe’s	 formulations	 also	 show	 that,	 for	 all	 of	 its	investment	 in	 the	 new,	 their	 modernism	 appears	 to	 get	 locked	 into	 a	 stale	 pattern,	forever	outmoding	 itself.	Habermas	 recognises	 that	 ‘the	distinguishing	mark	of	works	which	count	as	modern	is	“the	new”	which	will	be	overcome	and	made	obsolete	through	the	novelty	of	the	next	style’.18	The	onward	march	of	modernism	means	it	only	seems	as	new	 as	 its	 most	 vanguard	 front,	 so	 that	 the	 trailing	 remainder	 must	 appear	anachronistic,	a	static	relic	by	comparison.	Although	this	insistence	on	innovation	might	strike	one	as	the	precondition	of	its	timeliness	and	relevance,	as	a	profoundly	transient	form,	modernism	seems	to	anticipate	 its	desolation	and	 inefficacy.	 Indeed,	Howe	goes	further	than	Habermas	to	claim:			
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modernism	does	not	establish	a	prevalent	style	of	its	own;	or	if	it	does,	it	denies	itself,	 thereby	 ceasing	 to	be	modern.	This	presents	 it	with	 a	dilemma	which	 in	principle	may	be	beyond	solution	but	 in	practice	 leads	 to	 formal	 inventiveness	and	 resourceful	 dialectic—the	 dilemma	 that	 modernism	must	 always	 struggle	but	 never	 quite	 triumph,	 and	 then,	 after	 a	 time,	must	 struggle	 in	 order	 not	 to	triumph.	Modernism	 need	 never	 come	 to	 an	 end,	 or	 at	 least	 we	 do	 not	 really	know,	 as	 yet,	 how	 it	 can	 or	will	 reach	 its	 end.	 […].	 The	 essence	 of	modernism	reveals	 itself	 in	 the	 persuasion	 that	 the	 true	 question,	 the	 one	 alone	 worth	asking,	cannot	and	need	not	be	answered;	 it	need	only	be	asked	over	and	over	again,	forever	in	new	ways.19		
Modernism’s	animation	principle	 rests	upon	an	annulment	of	 its	 recent	self,	 a	kind	of	neutralisation	 of	 its	 productivity,	 which	 casts	 modernist	 art	 into	 a	 compulsive	 but	unavailing	 existence,	 which	 I	 elaborate	 on	 below	 as	 ‘vegetating	 life’	 in	 Kafka	 and	Beckett.	Notwithstanding	 the	danger	of	 reducing	modernism	 to	 a	 ravenous	 consumer	appetite	 for	 the	 latest	 fashion,	 the	 common	 account	 of	modernism	 as	 an	 avant-garde	sensibility,	as	sketched	above,	is	driven	by	a	forlorn	imperative,	as	each	new	approach	negates	 the	 last,	 to	 reveal	 at	 once	 a	 stimulating	 and	 numbing	 process.	 The	 ‘spirit’	 of	modernism,	then,	is	an	apposite	phrase	in	its	evocation	of	both	a	tenacious	life	force	and	spectral	lack	of	substance.				
Vegetating	Life:	Lukács,	Benjamin	and	Adorno	on	Kafka	and	Beckett	The	 enlivening-deadening	 duality	 of	 modernism	 can	 be	 related	 to	 Georg	 Lukács’s,	Walter	 Benjamin’s	 and	 Theodor	 Adorno’s	 uses	 of	 the	 pertinent	 word	 ‘vegetate’,	 or	derivatives,	to	describe	the	works	of	Kafka	and	Beckett,	as	well	as	Beckett’s	own	critical	
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evolution	of	the	word	‘vegetation’	in	relation	to	purgatory	in	Dante	Alighieri	and	James	Joyce.	 In	 Georg	 Lukács’s	 chapter	 ‘The	 Ideology	 of	 Modernism’	 from	 The	 Meaning	 of	
Contemporary	Realism	(German	1957	/	English	1962),	he	identifies	several	 limitations	in	 modernist	 literature	 that	 contribute	 to	 an	 essentially	 static	 conception	 of	 human	society	and	history,	despite	its	ostensible	dynamism.	Lukács’s	criticisms	of	modernism	include	 the	 excessive	 preoccupations	 with	 form,	 style	 and	 technique	 that	 govern	narrative	and	character;	the	focus	on	asocial	and	ahistorical	subjectivity	over	objectivity	that	reduces	subjects	to	superficial	developments	and	incoherent	experiences;	and	the	perverse	accentuation	of	psychopathology,	primitivism	and	allegory	at	 the	expense	of	perspective.	 Whereas	 contemporary	 bourgeois	 realism	 ‘has	 assumed	 change	 and	development	to	be	the	proper	subject	of	literature’,	Lukács	sees	an	overall	sense	of	fixity	in	modernist	 psychological	 narratives	 that	 swing	 between	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 the	present	and	recollections	of	the	past.20	Referring	in	particular	to	Joyce,	he	notes	that	‘the	perpetually	oscillating	patterns	of	sense-	and	memory-	data,	their	powerfully	charged	–	but	 aimless	 and	 directionless	 –	 fields	 of	 force,	 give	 rise	 to	 an	 epic	 structure	which	 is	static,	reflecting	a	belief	in	the	basically	static	character	of	events’.21	Despite	the	restless	movement	and	manic	energy	of	modernist	interiority,	Lukács	argues	that	it	amounts	to	a	 rather	 myopic	 and	 curiously	 conservative	 approach,	 without	 social	 context	 or	historical	progress.		Lukács’s	 forceful	 dichotomy	 of	 realism	 and	 modernism,	 ‘dynamic	 and	developmental	 on	 the	 one	hand,	 static	 and	 sensational	 on	 the	 other’	 is	well	 known.22	Less	 commonplace	 is	 his	 recourse	 to	 the	 language	 of	 purgatory	 to	 describe	 this	difference	in	relation	to	Kafka	and,	in	more	scathing	terms,	Beckett.	Like	Robert	Musil,	Kafka	 summons	 ‘the	 ghostly	 aspects	 of	 reality’,	 according	 to	 Lukács,	 whereby	 even	‘realistic	 detail	 is	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 ghostly	 un-reality,	 of	 a	 nightmare	world,	whose	
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function	is	to	evoke	angst’.23	This	unreality	is	intensified	when	adopting	the	perspective	of	 ‘an	 abnormal	 subject’,	 or,	 as	 in	 Beckett’s	 case,	 ‘an	 image	 of	 the	 utmost	 human	degradation	–	an	idiot’s	vegetative	existence’.24	For	both	writers,	Lukács	concedes,	the	immersion	 into	strange	psychological	worlds	 is	associated	with	 ‘life	under	capitalism’,	which	 is	 ‘often	 rightly,	 presented	 as	 a	 distortion	 (a	 petrification	 or	 paralysis)	 of	 the	human	 substance.	 But	 to	 present	 psychopathology	 as	 a	 way	 of	 escape	 from	 this	distortion	is	itself	a	distortion’.25	He	continues:		 This	 implies	 the	 absolute	 primacy	 of	 the	 terminus	 a	 quo,	 the	 condition	 from	which	 it	 is	 desired	 to	 escape.	 Any	 movement	 towards	 a	 terminus	 ad	 quem	 is	condemned	to	impotence.	As	the	ideology	of	most	modernist	writers	asserts	the	unalterability	 of	 outward	 reality	 (even	 if	 this	 is	 reduced	 to	 a	 mere	 state	 of	consciousness)	 human	 activity	 is,	 a	 priori,	 rendered	 impotent	 and	 robbed	 of	meaning.26		Lukács	perceives	a	vicious	cyclic	pattern,	with	modernists	indulging	in	the	symptoms	of	the	 problem,	 descending	 into	 the	 psychic	 disorders	 produced	 by	 the	 simultaneously	agitating	 and	 desensitising	 repetition	 compulsions	 of	 modern	 capitalist	 modes	 of	production.	 This	 generates	 a	 host	 of	 purgatorial	 conditions	 that	 Lukács	 touches	 on,	including	the	‘ghostly’,	‘vegetative’,	‘petrified’,	‘paralysed’	and	‘impotent’,	although	these	emerge	more	concretely	as	an	idiosyncratic,	secular	form	of	purgatory	in	the	hands	of	Benjamin,	Adorno	and	especially	Beckett.			In	Lukács’s	reference	to	 ‘vegetative	existence’	 in	particular,	he	invokes	multiple	related	meanings.	The	adjective,	 ‘vegetative’,	 features	in	Aristotle’s	philosophy	to	refer	to	‘one	component	of	the	irrational	part	of	the	soul,	namely	the	component	responsible	
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for	simple	growth	and	alteration’.27	The	vegetative	soul	is	the	entirety	of	plant	life	and	it	is	an	aspect	that	human	and	non-human	animals	possess	among	others.	This	basic	life	spirit	 of	 plants,	 added	 to	 their	 stillness,	 immobility	 and	 periods	 of	 dormancy,	means	‘they	“only	seem	to	live”’,	and	yet,	reduced	to	almost	non-being,	‘after	we	strip	life	of	all	its	 recognizable	 features,	 vegetal	 beings	 go	 on	 living’.28	 In	 the	 parlance	 of	 the	 French	‘poet	 of	 things’,	 Francis	 Ponge,	 the	 imperceptible	 but	 persistent	 biology	 of	 vegetation	‘gives	birth	to	living	crystals,	cristaux	vivants’,	as	if	stimulating	organic	activity	in	inert	mineral	substances.29	Through	such	associations	with	plants,	the	word	‘vegetate’	can	be	employed	to	differentiate	between	bare	existence	and	meaningful	life,	such	as	in	Colley	Cibber’s	1740	memoir	Apology	for	Life	of	Colley	Cibber:	 ‘The	Man	who	chuses	never	to	laugh…seems	to	me	only	 in	 the	quiet	State	of	a	green	Tree;	he	vegetates,	 ‘tis	 true,	but	shall	we	say	he	lives?’.30	Indeed,	in	German,	vegetieren	can	literally	translate	as	‘to	eke	out	a	bare	existence’.31	With	the	advent	of	psychoanalysis,	particularly	1930s	Reichian	psychotherapy	 or	 ‘vegetotherapy’,	 ‘“vegetative”	 life	 refers	 to	 the	 “vegetative	 nervous	system”.	 In	 English	 this	 is	 called	 the	 autonomic	 nervous	 system,	 that	 which	 governs	basic,	 involuntary	 functions.	 It	has	nothing	 to	do	with	plant	 life,	despite	 the	awkward	resemblance	 to	 “vegetables”	 in	 English’,	 according	 to	 James	 Strick.32	 This	 modern	connection	 to	 the	 nervous	 system	 gives	 rise	 to	 terms	 for	 related	medical	 conditions,	such	 as	 ‘persistent	 vegetative	 state’	 or	 ‘vegetative	 dormancy’.33	 Despite	 Strick’s	rejection,	 these	 names	 for	 nervous	 functions	 and	 chronic	 disorders	 of	 consciousness	encourage	parallels	with	 the	basic	 functions	of	 the	vegetative	soul	and	the	embedded,	passive,	relatively	diminished	life	of	plants,	to	the	extent	that	medical	researchers	have	sought	 more	 neutral	 terms,	 such	 as	 ‘unresponsive	 wakefulness	 syndrome’,	 to	 avoid	pejorative	associations	and	preserve	human	dignity.34	
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However,	 in	 Lukács’s	 account	 of	 modernism	 overall,	 he	 actually	 finds	 a	concomitance	of	ostensible	activity	and	veritable	inertia,	which	evokes	the	purgatorial	dual	meaning	already	secreted	in	the	verb	‘vegetate’,	as	a	term	that	includes	vitality	and	torpidity,	liveliness	and	lifelessness.	It	means	‘to	sprout;	to	germinate;	to	produce	new	growth’	as	well	as	‘to	lead	a	dull,	monotonous	life,	without	intellectual	or	social	activity;	to	 live	 or	 spend	 time	 in	 an	 unchallenging,	 inactive	 way’.35	 Together,	 these	 meanings	indicate	that	‘to	vegetate’	is	to	be	subject	to	an	ongoing	but	empty	life,	caught	between	renewal	and	repetition.	 It	 is	a	duality	that	smacks	of	Sigmund	Freud’s	speculations	on	competing	 life	 and	 death	 instincts	 in	 his	 1920	 essay	 ‘Beyond	 the	 Pleasure	 Principle’,	although	 Lukács	 strongly	 disagrees	 with	 attempts	 to	 ‘explain	 man’s	 social	 relations	from	his	individual	consciousness	(or	subconsciousness)’,	as	an	approach	that	‘turns	the	essence	 of	 things	 upside	 down’.36	 It	 is	 apparent	 that	 Lukács	 considered	 the	psychopathology	of	modernist	literature	to	share	the	same	systemic	errors	as	Freudian	psychoanalysis.	And	so,	 the	stand-off	between	activity	and	 inertia	underlying	Lukács’s	assessment	of	Joyce,	as	well	as	Kafka	and	Beckett	by	implication,	resembles	what	Freud	expresses	 as	 ‘a	 kind	 of	 fluctuating	 rhythm	within	 the	 life	 of	 organisms:	 one	 group	 of	drives	 goes	 storming	 ahead	 in	 order	 to	 attain	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 life	 at	 the	 earliest	possible	moment,	 another	 goes	 rushing	 back	 along	 the	way	 in	 order	 to	 do	 it	 all	 over	again	and	thus	prolong	the	journey’.37	It	is	a	paradoxically	vital	and	stagnating	rhythm	that	 Lukács	 finds	 foundational	 to	 modernism	 wholesale,	 as	 he	 accepts	 the	 flux	 of	individual	sense	impressions	and	loaded	subjective	experience	while	detecting	a	static,	unchanging	 macrocosm.	 Lukács’s	 ‘vegetative	 existence’	 effectively	 identifies	 both	modern	 conceptions	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 modernist	 aesthetics:	 it	 connotes	 a	 medical	assessment	 of	 psychological	 suspension,	 which,	 given	 modernism’s	 focus	 on	 the	
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individual	and	its	merging	of	form	and	content,	filters	into	the	purgatorial	dynamics	of	the	artwork’s	deep	structure.		The	phrase	that	Lukács	uses	to	decry	Beckett	specifically	is	one	that	both	Walter	Benjamin	and	Theodor	Adorno	evoke	as	champions	of	Kafka	and	Beckett.	 In	his	1934	essay	 for	 the	 10th	 anniversary	 of	 Kafka’s	 death,	 Benjamin	 compares	 the	 holders	 of	power	 in	 Kafka	 (court	 judges	 and	 castle	 secretaries)	 to	 the	 depressive	 Russian	statesman	 Grigory	 Potemkin,	 ‘who	 vegetates,	 somnolent	 and	 unkempt,	 in	 a	 remote,	inaccessible	 room’.	 Benjamin	 then	 asks:	 ‘Why	 do	 they	 vegetate?	 Could	 they	 be	 the	descendants	of	the	figures	of	Atlas	that	support	globes	with	their	shoulders’	or	‘it	is	just	that	 the	most	 commonplace	 things	 have	 their	weight’.38	 Under	 either	 the	 pressure	 of	great	 responsibility	 or	 the	 gravity	 of	 everyday	 details,	 such	 figures	 of	 authority	 are	rendered	vacant	and	inert.	While	these	mystifying	powers	encapsulate	the	dull,	inactive	side	of	vegetating	life,	the	assistants	or	messengers	in	Kafka’s	stories	convey	the	active	counterpart,	through	their	contingency	and	liminality.	Benjamin	likens	the	assistants	or	messengers	 to	 ‘Gandharvas’:	messengers	between	gods	and	humans	 in	Hinduism,	and	spirits	 between	 death	 and	 rebirth	 in	 Buddhism.39	 Such	 characters	 are	 ‘beings	 in	 an	unfinished	state’,	 ‘none	has	a	 firm	place	 in	 the	world,	 firm,	 inalienable	outlines’,	 ‘none	that	 has	 not	 completed	 its	 period	 of	 time	 and	 yet	 is	 unripe,	 none	 that	 is	 not	 deeply	exhausted	and	yet	 is	only	at	 the	beginning	of	a	 long	existence’.40	Benjamin	recognises	the	 purgatorial	 incompleteness	 of	 vegetating	 life	 in	 this	 striking	 depiction	 of	 lives	seemingly	 enervated	 and	 not	 completely	 terminated.	 In	 their	 imprecise	 ontological	state,	these	beings	are	precarious,	nebulous	and	condemned	to	be.	Benjamin	goes	on	to	enlist	 another	 echelon	 of	 character,	 the	 ‘fool’,	 as	 part	 of	 this	 ‘indefatigable’	 troop,	referring	specifically	to	those	in	‘Children	on	a	Country	Road’	(1910).41	The	inclusion	of	fools,	alongside	figures	of	power,	messengers	and	assistants	means	that	from	the	castles	
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and	courts	all	the	way	down	to	bewildered	victims	such	as	K,	Josef	K	and	Gregor	Samsa,	vegetating	 life	 infects	Kafka’s	entire	world,	 in	both	vacuously	 inanimate	and	aimlessly	wandering	forms.		Benjamin’s	 evocations	 of	 vegetation	 add	 a	 mythic,	 spiritual	 scale	 to	 Lukács’s	structural	and	psychopathological	 ideas.	He	elaborates	 further	 still	with	aesthetic	and	artistic	components,	drawing	on	the	infinite	meaning	of	gesture	and	the	provocation	of	failure.	Benjamin	writes	that	 ‘Kafka’s	entire	work	constitutes	a	code	of	gestures	which	surely	 had	 no	 definite	 symbolic	 meaning	 for	 the	 author	 from	 the	 outset;	 rather,	 the	author	 tried	 to	 derive	 such	 a	 meaning	 from	 them	 in	 ever-changing	 contexts	 and	experimental	 groupings’.42	 Lukács	 co-opts	Benjamin’s	 point	 here	 to	deprecate	Kafka’s	‘transcendental	Nothingness’,	citing	the	transferability	of	meaning	arising	from	the	deep	ambiguity	 of	 modernist	 allegory.43	 This	 proliferation	 of	 potential	 meaning	 and	deferment	of	stable	meaning	owing	to	varying	contexts	and	juxtapositions	generates	an	open,	 unsettled	 and	 unlimited	 spirit.	 The	 fact	 that	 many	 of	 Kafka’s	 stories	 were	abandoned	 as	 unfinished	 fragments	 and	 that	 he	 instructed	 his	 executor	Max	 Brod	 to	destroy	his	papers	on	his	death	‘says	that	the	writings	did	not	satisfy	their	author,	that	he	regarded	his	efforts	as	failures,	that	he	counted	himself	among	those	bound	to	fail’.44	The	dissatisfaction	and	inevitability	of	failure	that	Benjamin	sees	in	Kafka	can	indicate	an	unyielding	obligation	to	try,	which	also	implies	vegetative	dynamics,	not	least	those	found	in	modernism’s	own	creative	recommencement.		Benjamin’s	friend	and	critic	Adorno	also	employs	the	term	‘vegetate’	in	his	essay	‘Trying	 to	 Understand	 Endgame’	 (1961),	 in	 which	 he	 defends	 Beckett’s	 abstract	modernism	as	an	appropriate	artistic	response	to	the	‘damaged	life’	of	a	post-Holocaust	world	 that	 is	 effectively	 the	 culmination	 of	 late	 capitalism’s	 logic	 of	 ‘abstraction,	identification,	 exchange	 and	 use	 which	 characterises	 all	 human	 relationships	 and	
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relationships	to	the	world,	and	that	allows	for	no	spontaneity	or	difference	to	arise’,	as	Alistair	 Morgan	 puts	 it.45	 The	 protracted	 denouement	 that	 Hamm	 and	 Clov	 suffer	 in	
Endgame	(1957)	attests	to	an	era	in	which	‘[h]umankind	continues	to	vegetate,	creeping	along	after	events	that	even	the	survivors	cannot	really	survive,	on	a	rubbish	heap	that	has	 made	 even	 reflection	 on	 one’s	 own	 damaged	 state	 useless’.46	 In	 this	 instance,	vegetating	 life	 refers	 to	 the	 human	 condition	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 a	 global	epistemological	 and	 ontological	 event.	 People	 are	 not	 really	 living	 as	 they	 once	were	and	are	therefore	not	survivors	in	the	common	sense;	although	they	live	on,	they	are	so	thoroughly	transformed	as	to	be	disparate	from	their	prior	selves.	The	power	of	thought	is	 also	 impacted,	 as	 the	 catastrophic	 event	 ensures	 it	 exempts	 itself	 from	comprehension	by	leaving	people	unable	to	rationalise	or	represent	what	has	happened	lucidly.	The	subtitle	to	Adorno’s	1951	book	Minima	Moralia,	‘reflections	from	damaged	life’,	underlines	this	affront	to	philosophical	examination.47	The	choice	of	‘from’,	rather	than	 ‘on’,	 shows	 that	 all	 sense-making	 reflections	 are	 now	 impaired.	 Only	 the	fragmented,	incoherent	state	of	the	‘reflections’	themselves	gives	any	indication	of	what	they	attempted	to	reflect	on	or	about.	Equally,	Adorno’s	epigram	to	that	text,	Ferdinand	Kürnberger’s	‘life	does	not	live’,	repeats	one	of	the	dualities	of	vegetation,	exposing	the	difference	between	life	proper	and	bare	existence.	As	Morgan	explains,	 ‘implicit	 in	the	phrase	“life	does	not	live”	is	the	assumption	that	the	verb	“to	live”	implies	a	fuller	sense	of	life	which	either	lies	repressed	beneath	the	existence	of	a	life	that	does	not	live,	or	as	a	 suppressed	 possibility	 within	 this	 deadened	 form	 of	 existence’.48	 For	 Adorno,	vegetating	life,	which	entails	the	decay	of	experience,	the	impairment	of	reflection	and	the	immersion	in	cultural	and	philosophical	ruins,	is	the	malady	of	modernity.		Yet,	 in	 contrast	 to	 Lukács,	 it	 is	 crucial	 for	 Adorno	 that	 this	 malady	 spreads	through	 modernist	 art	 too,	 particularly	 post-Holocaust	 late	 modernism.	 In	 Adorno’s	
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essay	on	‘Metaphysics’,	he	notes:	 ‘the	cheap	jibe	that	Beckett	can	never	get	away	from	urns,	refuse	bins,	and	sand	heaps	in	which	people	vegetate	between	life	and	death	–	as	they	 actually	 vegetated	 in	 the	 concentration	 camps	 –	 this	 jibe	 seems	 to	 me	 just	 a	desperate	 attempt	 to	 fend	 off	 the	 knowledge	 that	 these	 are	 exactly	 the	 things	 that	matter’.49	Referring	to	Beckett’s	Play	(1963),	Endgame	and	Happy	Days	(1961),	Adorno’s	comment	 highlights	 the	 human	 potential	 to	 suffer	 limbo	 on	 earth,	 as	 an	 interstice	between	animate	and	 inanimate,	between	 life	and	death.	His	conception	of	vegetating	life	 after	 Beckett,	 then,	 intensifies	 the	 condemned	 existence	 that	 he	 already	 saw	 in	Kafka.	Adorno	writes	in	his	‘Notes	on	Kafka’:			 In	 the	 concentration	 camps,	 the	 boundary	 between	 life	 and	 death	 was	eradicated.	 A	 middle	 ground	 was	 created,	 inhabited	 by	 living	 skeletons	 and	putrefying	bodies,	victims	unable	to	take	their	own	lives,	Satan’s	laughter	at	the	hope	of	 abolishing	death.	As	 in	Kafka’s	 twisted	epics,	what	perished	 there	was	that	which	had	provided	the	criterion	of	experience	–	life	lived	out	to	its	end.50			Adorno	takes	the	absence	of	an	end	point,	or	‘terminus	ad	quem’,	that	Lukács	criticised	in	Kafka	and	Beckett’s	non-progressive,	dystopian	modernism,	and	refigures	it	as	a	form	of	ethically	engaged	literature	congruous	to	the	times.	Therefore,	damaged	life,	of	which	vegetation	 is	 a	 part,	 is	 not	 merely	 an	 escape	 from	 the	 social	 and	 historical	 concrete	world	of	realism.	It	is	the	ubiquitous	product	of	the	context	that	art	must	also	imbibe.	In	the	strongest	terms,	anything	else	would	not	be	a	remedy;	it	would	be	a	travesty.		Adorno’s	use	of	 ‘vegetate’	 to	describe	an	endless	 limbo	between	 life	and	death	recalls	 Beckett’s	 own	 earlier	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘vegetation’	 in	 his	 1929	 essay,	 ‘Dante…	Bruno.	 Vico..	 Joyce’,	 written	 to	 support	 Joyce’s	 ‘Work	 in	 Progress’	 (later	 Finnegans	
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Wake).	Beckett	compares	Dante’s	temporary	and	Joyce’s	permanent	forms	of	vegetation	to	 relate	 two	conceptions	of	purgatory.	He	writes:	 ‘In	 the	one	 there	 is	an	ascent	 from	real	vegetation	–	Ante-Purgatory,	to	ideal	vegetation	–	Terrestrial	Paradise:	in	the	other	there	 is	 no	 ascent	 and	 no	 ideal	 vegetation’.51	 Beckett	 notices	 that	 Dante	 presents	 a	progressive	model	from	real	to	ideal	vegetation,	which	follows	the	purgatory	outlined	in	the	Catechism	of	 the	Roman	Catholic	Church.	 In	 this	rendering,	 ‘purgatory	offered	 the	soul	a	post-mortem	second	chance	to	satisfy	the	debts	due	to	its	redeemer	for	its	bodily	and	spiritual	sins’.52	A	spiritual	sorting	process	identifies	the	penitent	souls	required	to	undergo	this	purifying	period	of	vegetation	owing	to	their	unpaid	venial	sins.	This	is	a	process	that	is	conveyed	elsewhere	in	Christian	scripture	through	a	harvesting	analogy,	although	the	Bible	does	not	explicitly	support	the	notion	of	a	provisional	afterlife	before	admittance	 to	 heaven.	 Chapter	 13	 of	 the	 Gospel	 of	Matthew,	 the	 Parable	 of	 Tares	 or	Weeds,	 teaches	of	 the	angels	dividing	humanity	 into	either	 the	heaven-bound	good	or	the	hell-bound	evil.	After	a	man	sowed	his	 field	with	good	seed,	 ‘his	enemy	came	and	sowed	tares	among	the	wheat	and	went	his	way’.	On	discovery,	the	man	announces:	‘Let	both	grow	together	until	the	harvest,	and	at	the	time	of	harvest	I	will	say	to	the	reapers,	“First	gather	together	the	tares	and	bind	them	in	bundles	to	burn	them,	but	gather	the	wheat	into	my	barn”’.	The	act	of	separating	the	good	wheat	from	the	unwanted	tares	(to	burn	 in	an	act	of	purification)	brings	 to	mind	 the	proverb	 ‘separating	 the	wheat	 from	the	chaff’,	or	its	variation,	the	grain	from	the	husks.		The	 harvesting	 analogy	 presents	 an	 image	 of	 divine	 judgement	 that	 Beckett	knows	well	as	a	raised	Protestant	and	utilises	occasionally	over	the	course	of	his	career,	most	 famously	 in	 the	opening	part	of	Krapp’s	Last	Tape	 through	the	reference	to	a	39	year-old	 Krapp	 ‘Sat	 before	 the	 fire	 with	 closed	 eyes,	 separating	 the	 grain	 from	 the	husks’.53	The	image	takes	its	most	Beckettian	form	in	his	1951	novel,	Malone	Dies,	 the	
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middle	 text	 of	 his	 post-war	 trilogy.	 A	 bed-ridden	 Malone	 passes	 away	 time	 telling	himself	 stories,	 including	 the	 narrative	 of	 Macmann,	 who	 has	 ‘a	 cast-iron	 vegetative	system’	and	 ‘sat	 and	 lay	down	at	 the	 least	pretext	 and	only	 rose	again	when	 the	élan	vital	or	struggle	for	life	began	to	prod	him	in	the	arse	again’.54	Despite	living	on	a	farm,	Macmann’s	ability	to	identify	the	wheat	from	the	weeds	deserts	him:	‘suddenly	all	swam	before	 his	 eyes,	 he	 could	 no	 longer	 distinguish	 the	 plants	 destined	 for	 the	embellishment	of	the	home	or	the	nutrition	of	man	and	beast	from	the	weeds	which	are	said	to	serve	no	useful	purpose,	but	which	must	have	their	usefulness	too,	for	the	earth	to	favour	them	so’.55	Macmann	is	not	damning	in	his	assessment	of	weeds	because	he	is	unable	 to	 distinguish	 between	 plants	 types	 and	 assumes	 the	 ubiquity	 of	weeds	must	evidence	 their	 usefulness	 somehow.	 This	 more	 inclusive,	 indiscriminate	 stance	presumably	 applies	 to	 the	 symbolic	 equivalent	 of	 weeds,	 the	 lost	 souls,	 which	problematises	the	binary	judgement	of	heaven	or	hell	and	raises	the	prospect	of	a	more	complex	 spectrum	 ranging	 from	 good	 to	 evil,	 valuable	 to	 worthless,	 that	 tallies	 with	Beckett’s	 evocations	 of	 a	 purgatorial	 middle	 ground	 in	 his	 corpus	 that	 confuses	 the	boundaries	of	life	and	death.		Similarly,	Kafka	raises	a	purgatorial	state	from	a	Biblical	symbol	through	plants	and	fire	in	his	earlier	parabolic	fragment,	‘The	Thorn	Bush’,	probably	written	in	1922,	in	which	 a	man	 gets	 stuck	 in	 a	 thorn	 bush	 and	must	wait	 for	 the	 park	 directors	 to	 get	permission	 to	 release	him.	The	 agitated	man	 is	 literally	 trapped	 in	 vegetation;	 in	 this	prickly	suspension	he	can	think	but	not	act,	speak	but	not	move.	The	fragment	alludes	to	Exodus	3:2,	Moses	and	the	Burning	Bush,	which	Kafka	aphorises	as:	‘The	thorn	bush	is	the	old	obstacle	in	the	road.	It	must	catch	fire	if	you	want	to	go	further’.56	As	Richie	Robertson	 acknowledges,	 through	 the	 symbol	 of	 the	 thorn	 bush,	 Kafka	 shows	 that	‘[s]piritual	 progress	must	 be	 through	 the	 fire,	 an	 image	 recalling	 purgatory’.57	 These	
Joseph	Anderton,	‘Vegetating	Life	and	the	Spirit	of	Modernism’		
Modernism/modernity,	John	Hopkins	University	Press	
	 17	
allusions	to	burning	bushes	and	weeds	in	Kafka	and	Beckett	are	reminders	that	parts	of	the	discourse	of	the	final	judgment	are	loosely	entwined	with	plant	life,	and	that	a	non-binary	vegetating	life	germinates	from	them.			While	an	implicit	grey	area	between	heaven	and	hell,	amidst	the	wheat	and	the	weeds,	and	within	the	thorn	bush,	reinforces	the	connection	between	temporary	forms	of	vegetation	and	purgatory,	in	Joyce’s	‘no	ascent	and	no	ideal	vegetation’,	the	prevailing	image	is	not	of	climbing	towards	a	summit	to	achieve	cathartic	release,	but	one	of	cyclic,	perpetuating	activity.	In	his	reading	of	Joyce,	Beckett	draws	on	the	Italian	philosopher	Giambattista	Vico’s	notion	of	the	ideal	eternal	history	from	Scienza	Nuova	(1725),	which	Beckett	articulates	as	‘all	humanity	circling	with	fatal	monotony	about	the	Providential	fulcrum’.58	Having	identified	this	cyclic	pattern,	Beckett	argues	that	there	is	‘a	continual	purgatorial	process	at	work’	 in	 Joyce	owing	 to	 its	structural	preclusion	of	 totality	and	stylistic	 revolutions.59	He	writes	 of	 ‘the	 absolute	 absence	of	 the	Absolute’	 and	 locates	this	characteristic	in	miniature	in	his	compatriot’s	late	style:	‘There	is	an	endless	verbal	germination,	maturation,	putrefaction,	 the	cyclic	dynamism	of	the	 intermediate’.60	The	indeterminacy	 and	 recurrence	 that	 Beckett	 reads	 in	 Joyce	 are	 analogous	 with	 the	constellation	 of	 restless	 vegetative	 dynamics	 expressed	 in	 Benjamin	 and	 Adorno’s	reflections	 on	 Kafka	 and	 Beckett,	 particularly	 the	 sense	 of	 an	 unfinished	 or	 endless	condition.	The	 interrelation	between	vegetating	 life	and	purgatory	 is	 founded	on	such	dynamics,	 and	does	not	 exclude	 the	plant-like	 overtones	 of	 vegetation	because	 of	 the	perceived	 infinite	 drive	 of	 plant	 life,	 as	 Michael	 Marder	 notes	 in	 Plant-Thinking:	 ‘if	incompletion	means	open-endedness,	 then	vegetal	growth	fully	satisfies	this	rendition	of	ateles,	 in	 that	 it	 knows	neither	an	 inherent	end,	nor	 limit’.61	Although	Marder	 cites	passivity	 and	 torpor	 as	 other	 vegetal	 characteristics,	 the	 process	 of	 reproduction	 ‘by	replacing	 what	 goes	 off	 or	 is	 antiquated	 with	 something	 other’	 leads	 to	 ‘pure	
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proliferation	 bereft	 of	 a	 sense	 of	 closure’.62	 The	 peculiar	 incompletion	 of	 plants,	together	with	the	activity	and	stasis	in	vegetation	more	broadly,	is	strangely	evocative	of	modernism’s	acts	of	self-preservation	through	prolific	transformation.	It	is	via	Joyce,	then,	that	Beckett	identifies	a	suitably	modern	model	of	vegetation	that	challenges	the	linearity	implied	in	Dante’s	ascending	spiral	and	replaces	it	with	an	idea	of	movement	as	 ‘non-directional	 –	 or	multi-directional,	 and	 a	 step	 forward	 is,	 by	 definition,	 a	 step	back’,	which	seems	 to	conflate	or	collapse	notions	of	progression	and	retrogression.63	Although	 the	 esteemed	 mythologist	 Joseph	 Campbell	 argues	 that	 Joyce’s	 Finnegans	
Wake	 is	 like	Dante’s	 vision	of	purgatory	 in	 that	 it	 ‘is	written	 in	 a	 circle	with	 a	 break:	there	is	an	out’,	for	Beckett,	Joyce	has	a	regenerative	and	therefore	interminable	quality	that	 extends	 purgatory	 beyond	 an	 intermediate	 zone	 indefinitely.64	 It	 is	 this	 distinct	state	of	suspension	without	deliverance	that	emerges	as	vegetating	life	in	the	works	of	Kafka	and	Beckett.	
	
Resolution:	Renewable	Deixis	in	Kafka’s	Short	Stories	The	vegetating	life	composited	from	Lukács,	Benjamin,	Adorno	and	Beckett	is	restlessly	static,	 incomplete,	 residual	 and	 cyclic.	These	dynamics	 resound	 in	Kafka’s	diaries,	not	only	 in	blatantly	negative	expressions,	 such	as	 ‘[o]nly	 this	everlasting	waiting,	eternal	helplessness’,	 in	 which	 Kafka	 chronicles	 his	 depressive	 feelings	 of	 incarceration,	 but	also	when	he	articulates	the	complex	duality	of	vegetating	life,	as	it	vacillates	between	or	 otherwise	 conflates	 activity	 and	 passivity,	 continuation	 and	 termination.65	 In	 an	entry	dated	6th	August	1914,	Kafka	notes	 ‘my	 life	has	dwindled	dreadfully,	nor	will	 it	cease	to	dwindle.	 […]	I	waver,	continually	 fly	to	the	summit	of	 the	mountain,	but	then	fall	back	 in	a	moment.	 […]	I	waver	on	the	heights;	 it	 is	not	death,	alas,	but	the	eternal	torments	of	dying’.66	Kafka	acknowledges	an	 infinite	capacity	 to	diminish	 in	a	manner	
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akin	to	Zeno’s	dichotomy	paradox,	as	he	becomes	less	and	less	but	never	nothing.	In	a	different	but	still	interminable	process,	he	also	describes	traversing	the	poles	of	ecstasy	and	misery,	with	 the	 implied	 adverbs	 ‘continually’	 and	 ‘eternally’	 preventing	 his	 end.	Dying	is	not	death,	Kafka	is	well	aware.	Later	 in	the	same	year,	he	expresses	a	similar	plight,	this	time	in	relation	to	his	literature:	‘I	can’t	write	any	more.	I’ve	come	up	against	the	 last	 boundary,	 before	which	 I	 shall	 in	 all	 likelihood	 again	 sit	 down	 for	 years,	 and	then	 in	 all	 likelihood	 begin	 another	 story	 all	 over	 again	 that	 will	 again	 remain	unfinished.	 This	 fate	 pursues	 me’.67	 By	 ‘can’t	 write	 any	 more’,	 Kafka	 means	 he	 has	stalled	 on	 this	 story	 and	 is	 unable	 to	 conclude.	 As	 the	 repetition	 of	 ‘again’	 shows,	 he	actually	 has	 a	 strong	 urge	 to	 create	 and	 will	 write	 much	 more	 in	 other	 attempts,	although,	like	his	many	unfinished	stories,	Kafka	is	consigned	to	the	infinite	process	as	much	as	the	finite	product.			Examples	 of	 ‘vegetative	 existence’	 are	 plentiful	 in	 Kafka’s	 fiction	 too,	 from	 the	judicial	vortex	of	The	Trial	(1914-15)	to	the	unobtainable	goal	in	The	Castle	(1922).	He	consistently	 centres	 on	 forsaken	 protagonists	 floundering	 in	 the	 perplexing	mechanisms	of	authority,	which	leads	Howe	to	assert	that	Kafka	‘presents	dilemmas;	he	cannot	and	soon	does	not	wish	to	resolve	them;	he	offers	his	struggle	with	them	as	the	substance	 of	 his	 testimony;	 […].	 After	 Kafka	 it	 becomes	 hard	 to	 believe	 not	 only	 in	answers	 but	 even	 in	 endings’.68	 No	 instance	 of	 Kafkaesque	 vegetation	 is	 more	compelling	 than	 the	 story	 of	 the	 mysterious	 Hunter	 Gracchus,	 who	 fell	 to	 his	 death	while	hunting	deer	in	the	Black	Forest.	Written	in	1917,	it	begins	with	Gracchus	arriving	in	Riva	by	boat,	supine	on	a	bier,	to	tell	his	tale	to	the	Mayor,	or	Burgomaster:				 ‘Are	you	dead?’		‘Yes,’	said	the	Hunter.	‘As	you	see.’	[…]	
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‘But	you	are	alive	too’	said	the	Burgomaster.	‘In	a	certain	sense,’	said	the	Hunter,	‘in	a	certain	sense	I	am	alive	too.’69		There	is	a	note	of	humour	in	Gracchus’s	‘as	you	see’	comment,	which	presumes	that	him	being	dead	is	self-evident,	despite	him	walking	and	talking.	Gracchus	being	alive,	on	the	other	hand,	 is	demoted	 to	 the	vague	 ‘in	a	certain	sense’.	 If	 the	deathly	element	seems	foremost,	it	is	not	fatally	so,	as	Gracchus	remains	suspended	in	a	limbo	that	contravenes	both	 life	 and	 death.	 It	 is	 not	 exactly	 a	 petrified,	 standstill	 existence	 either.	 In	 fact,	 he	notes	twice,	‘I	am	always	in	motion’,	although	the	repetition	of	this	statement	betrays	its	etiolated	quality	too.	Gracchus	explains:	‘I	am	forever,	on	the	great	stair	that	leads	up	to	it	 [the	 other	 world].	 On	 that	 infinitely	 wide	 and	 spacious	 stair	 I	 clamber	 about,	sometimes	up,	sometimes	down,	sometimes	on	the	right,	sometimes	on	the	left,	always	in	motion’.70	Despite	Harold	Bloom’s	attempt	to	define	the	Gracchus	myth	as	a	parable	for	 Kafkaesque	 writing	 as	 ‘repetition,	 labyrinthine	 and	 burrow-building’,	 Gracchus’s	erratic	movement	 here,	 ranging	 indiscriminately	 in	 all	 directions	 eternally,	 inevitably	does	 evoke	 purgatorial	 myths,	 including	 the	 Wandering	 Jew	 and	 the	 ghost	 ship,	 the	Flying	 Dutchman.71	 Gracchus	 repeats:	 ‘I	 am	 always	 in	 motion.	 But	 when	 I	 make	 a	supreme	flight	and	see	the	gate	shining	before	me	I	awaken	presently	on	my	old	ship,	still	stranded	forlornly	 in	some	earthly	sea	or	other’.72	Kafka	reveals	a	more	mundane	inspiration	 for	 the	 story	 in	 his	 diary	 entry	 from	 6th	 April	 1917	 where	 he	 recalls	witnessing	 a	 boat	 arriving	 at	 the	 port	 and	 no	 passengers	 disembarking.73	 In	 that	experience,	Kafka	presumably	 thought	 the	helmsman	was	destined	never	 to	 leave	 the	boat.	In	the	written	story,	it	is	striking	that	Gracchus	emphasises	his	restless	movement,	to	ensure	that	being	stranded	is	understood	as	a	sentence	to	be	active,	which	pertains	to	the	 vegetative	 life	 in	 Lukács’s	 readings	 of	 modernism	 suspended	 in	 animation,	
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Benjamin’s	 exhausted,	 unfinished	 beings	 and	 Adorno’s	 broken	 creatures	 in	 quasi-survival.				Although	 Gracchus’s	movement	 is	 constant,	 it	 is	 not	 linear	 or	 progressive	 and	therefore	 will	 not	 amount	 to	 salvation	 or	 redemption.	 His	 world	 is	 ‘a	 meaninglessly	revolving	carrousel	on	which	the	end	flows	again	and	again	into	the	beginning’;	he	is	an	‘eternally	 living-dead	 man,	 who	 can	 neither	 live	 nor	 die’,	 subject	 to	 the	 ‘durable	presence	of	catastrophe,	which	becomes	a	normal,	permanent	condition’.74	It	is	a	state	of	being	he	recognises	in	himself:	‘I	am	here,	more	than	that	I	do	not	know,	further	than	that	I	cannot	go.	My	ship	has	no	rudder,	and	it	is	driven	by	the	wind	that	blows	in	the	undermost	regions	of	death’.75	Gracchus	is	apparently	adrift,	devoid	of	agency	and	at	the	mercy	 of	 external	 forces.	 In	 this	 existential	 crisis,	 he	 is	 divested	 of	 a	 teleological	trajectory	 and	 therefore	 shackled	 to	 the	 immediate	 context,	 the	 place	 currently	occupied.	Kafka	reinforces	this	 ‘eternal	present’	through	his	narrative	tense,	according	to	Dorrit	Cohn,	who	argues	that	the	‘present	tense	used	by	the	ghostly	narrators	is	the	grammatical	 signal	 for	 their	unrelieved	survival’.76	But	 ‘here’	 is	 felt	as	a	more	specific	limit	too,	as	the	boundary	of	Gracchus’s	knowledge	in	his	mobile	prison,	which	suggests	he	 is	 restricted	 to	 the	 present	 in	 more	 ways	 than	 one.	 Early	 in	 the	 story,	 Gracchus	implies	he	has	comprehensive	knowledge	of	the	world,	yet	it	transpires	he	is	forgetful	and	must	be	reminded	 ‘in	 the	 first	moments	of	 returning	 to	consciousness’,	 signalling	his	 deficient	 powers	 of	 recall.77	 Without	 a	 reliable,	 self-initiated	 memory,	 the	 rich	contexts	of	the	wider	world	and	past	experience	are	oddly	unavailable	to	him.			The	emphasis	on	‘here’	in	Gracchus’s	‘I	am	here’,	with	its	sense	of	being	anchored	in	a	 spatial	and	 temporal	present,	 lends	significance	 to	Kafka’s	 later	micro	piece,	 ‘The	Departure’,	written	between	1920	and	1921.	The	last	lines	read:			
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“Where	is	the	master	going?”	“I	don’t	know,”	I	said,	“just	out	of	here,	just	out	of	here.	Out	of	here,	nothing	else,	it’s	the	only	way	I	can	reach	my	goal.”	“So	you	know	your	goal?”	he	asked.	“Yes,”	I	replied,	“I’ve	just	told	you.	Out	of	here	–	that’s	my	goal.”78		Clearly,	the	master’s	imperative	is	to	leave,	but	as	a	deictic	word	dependent	on	context,	‘here’	 can	 exceed	 a	 singular	 place.	 It	 has	 the	 peculiar	 ability	 to	 follow	 the	 master,	pointing	 to	 each	 current	 situation.	 The	 goal	 to	 get	 out	 of	 here	 is	 therefore	 foiled	infinitely	 as	 it	 is	 repeatedly	 reset,	 which	 evokes	 the	 unachievable,	 self-perpetuating	aspiration	of	modernism.	Readers	are	made	aware	of	this	 indexical	regeneration	at	an	acute	 level	 through	 the	 repetition	 of	 the	 word	 ‘here’	 four	 times	 in	 quick	 succession.	Logically	speaking,	the	reference	point	in	the	first	utterance	is	minutely	different	to	the	last	utterance;	indeed,	escaping	begins	as	a	means	to	reach	his	goal,	before	transmuting	into	 the	 goal	 itself.	 This	 deictic	 mobility	 reveals	 the	 renewability	 of	 ‘here’,	 while	simultaneously	 appearing	 and	 sounding	 rather	 hackneyed	 owing	 to	 its	 frequency.	 It	conveys	both	a	fresh	context	and	a	nagging	imperative.	In	a	little	over	a	hundred	words,	then,	 Kafka	 evokes	 modernism’s	 transformation	 from	 a	 single,	 historically	 necessary	departure	in	‘out	of	here	to	reach	my	goal’	to	an	abortive	and	persistent	spirit	in	‘out	of	here	–	that’s	my	goal’.		Kafka	 expresses	 vegetating	 life	 in	 different	 terms	 in	 his	 fragment	 ‘Resolutions’	(1911),	 translated	 from	 the	 German	 title	 ‘Entschlüsse’	 (decisions),	 a	 relative	 of	
Entschlossenheit	 (determination).	 The	 title	 itself	 holds	 connotations	 of	 finitude,	 in	 the	way	 something	 can	 be	 resolved,	 as	 well	 as	 connotations	 of	 purpose,	 as	 in	 something	steadfast	 or	 resolute.	 Like	 the	 related	 word	 ‘determination’,	 resolution	 is	 at	 once	 an	
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expression	of	closure	and	perseverance.	Kafka’s	short	piece	utilises	 this	duality	 in	 the	narrator’s	 failure	 to	 integrate	socially	and	his	 recourse	 to	a	more	hermetic,	 solipsistic	existence.	It	finishes	on	the	following	note:		 perhaps	 the	best	resource	 is	 to	meet	everything	passively,	 to	make	yourself	an	inert	mass,	and,	if	you	feel	that	you	are	being	carried	away,	not	to	let	yourself	be	lured	into	taking	a	single	unnecessary	step,	to	stare	at	others	with	the	eyes	of	an	animal,	 to	 feel	no	compunction,	 in	short,	with	your	own	hand	 to	 throttle	down	whatever	 ghostly	 life	 remains	 in	 you,	 that	 is,	 to	 enlarge	 the	 final	 peace	 of	 the	graveyard	and	let	nothing	survive	save	that.79		Kafka’s	 narrator	 describes	 conditions	 associated	 with	 a	 vegetative	 existence	 in	 his	recourse	 to	passivity,	 inertia,	 emotional	 austerity,	 suppressed	ghostly	 life	 and	deathly	peace.	 The	 difference	 in	 this	 example	 is	 that	 the	 narrator	 articulates	 a	 contradictory	state	of	willed	lifelessness	involving	a	decision	to	become	a	nonentity,	so	that	apathy	is	actually	desired	as	a	facility	to	be	used.	Curiously,	there	is	resistance	to	life	at	work	in	this	 instance	 in	which	 the	very	act	of	 resisting	 life	would	 contain	 some	of	 the	vitality	that	 is	 supposedly	 resisted.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 volition	 implied	 in	 ‘making	 yourself’,	‘not	letting’,	 ‘throttling	down’	and	‘letting	nothing’	constitutes	a	paradoxical	process	of	‘self-denial’,	 wherein	 the	 presence	 of	 self	 is	 reinforced	 in	 the	 act	 of	 self-effacement.	However,	 considering	 the	 combination	 of	 activity	 and	 stasis	 outlined	 in	 the	 forms	 of	vegetating	life	above,	it	is	arguably	this	impulsion	with	designs	on	passivity	that	ensures	the	endless	end	of	vegetation	 is	more	 thoroughly	achieved.	Kafka	effectively	reveals	a	quirk	 of	 vegetative	 life	 through	 the	 narrative	 voice	 actively	 pursuing	 inactivity	 and	expending	 energy	 on	 a	 lacklustre	 state.	 This	 dynamic	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 negative	
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formulation	 of	 the	 utopian	 progress	 that	 underpins	 modernism,	 where	 the	 spirit	 is	redirected	into	neutrality	and	indifference.	It	is	a	perverse	appropriation	that	presages	the	intersection	of	modernist	élan	and	late	modernist	fatigue.		The	vegetating	life	in	renewable	deictic	language	and	the	paradox	of	self-denial	can	 therefore	be	added	 to	Weller’s	 identification	of	Kafka’s	 ‘linguistic	negativism’	as	a	‘proleptic’	 realisation	of	 late	modernism.80	 In	 ‘Performing	 the	Negative:	Kafka	and	 the	Origins	 of	 Late	 Modernism’	 (2016),	 Weller	 examines	 the	 frequency	 and	 variety	 of	negative	 language	 components	 and	modifiers	 in	 Kafka’s	 stories,	 particularly	 the	 ‘un-’	affix	as	a	‘morphological	enactment	of	a	negation’,	to	argue	that	Kafka	is	a	precursor	to	Beckett’s	 late	 modern	 ‘literature	 of	 the	 unword’.81	 After	 referring	 to	 Adorno’s	 and	Blanchot’s	reflections	on	Gracchus’s	experience	of	‘undeath’	as	a	‘terrifying	vision	of	the	living	death	to	be	experienced	by	so	many	in	the	Nazi	concentration	camps	and	Soviet	gulags’,	Weller	concludes	that:		 The	 emergence	 of	 late	modernism	 in	Europe	owes	 so	much	 to	Kafka	precisely	because	his	 is	 a	 literature	of	 the	dark	 times,	 in	which	being	 (above	 all,	 human	being)	 can	 only	 be	 defined	 negatively,	 and	 in	 which,	 ironically,	 no	 amount	 of	negativity	can,	for	all	its	justification,	reduce	being	to	nothing,	the	animate	to	the	inanimate,	the	properly	living	to	the	properly	dead.82			Weller	 refers	 to	 Kafka’s	 historical	 relevance	 for	 post-Holocaust	 late	 modernists	 here	and	 yet	 the	 surviving,	 purgatorial	 dynamic	 he	 describes	 also	 relates	 to	 the	 spirit	 of	modernism’s	 own	 persistence	 as	 a	 vestigial	 presence	 in	 late	 modernism.	 If	 late	modernism	 is,	 as	Weller	 states	elsewhere,	 ‘perhaps	best	understood	precisely	as	such	an	 art	 of	 impotence	 and	 ignorance,	 an	 art	 that	 no	 longer	 trusts	 the	 power	 of	 the	
Joseph	Anderton,	‘Vegetating	Life	and	the	Spirit	of	Modernism’		
Modernism/modernity,	John	Hopkins	University	Press	
	 25	
aesthetic	to	achieve	epiphany,	that	no	longer	believes	art	can’,	one	of	the	ways	this	takes	shape	in	Kafka’s	nascent	form	is	an	exposure	to	the	renewability	of	a	failing	moment.83	The	elusiveness	of	 ‘here’	 transforms	 from	multiple	 rousing	opportunities	 to	wretched	eternal	 toil.	 To	 adopt	Kafka’s	 title	 ‘Resolutions’,	 the	 active	 component,	 or	 ‘resolve’,	 of	modernism	appears	to	attend	and	protract	its	closure,	or	 ‘resolution’,	 leaving	traces	of	modernist	life	compelling	the	negative,	attenuated	formulations	of	late	modernism.		
‘No	Ideal	Vegetation’:	Void	Deixis	in	Beckett’s	Texts	for	Nothing	While	Kafka	 envisions	 the	 suspended	 animation	 implicit	 in	 high	modernist	 dynamics,	Beckett	 exemplifies	 it	 as	 an	 author	 writing	 predominantly	 after	 1945,	 during	modernism’s	plateau.	The	endlessness	of	vegetating	life	pervades	Beckett’s	writing	from	his	 last	prose	 text,	Stirrings	Still,	 in	1989,	back	to	his	 first	published	novel,	Murphy,	 in	1938,	in	which	the	title	character	pursues	a	remarkably	similar	kind	of	‘will-lessness’	to	that	expressed	in	Kafka,	in	the	third,	dark	level	of	his	mind	where	there	is	‘nothing	but	forms	becoming	and	crumbling	into	the	fragments	of	a	new	becoming,	without	love	or	hate	or	any	intelligible	principle	of	change’.84	Texts	for	Nothing,	a	series	of	13	short	texts	written	 between	 1950	 and	 1951,	 is	 a	 particularly	 pertinent	 example	 given	 the	 title’s	indication	of	 activity	without	prospect	 or	 progress.	Bearing	 in	mind	 that	Kafka	 found	himself	stuck	in	a	creative	loop	of	starting	but	never	ending	stories,	Texts	for	Nothing	is	significant	as	a	response	to	Beckett’s	own	creative	impasse	after	L’Innommable,	written	between	March	1949	and	September	1950.	In	a	letter	to	Jerome	Lindon	in	April	1951,	he	confides:	‘it	has	left	me	in	a	sorry	state.	I’m	trying	to	get	over	it.	But	I	am	not	getting	over	it.	I	do	not	know	if	it	will	be	able	to	make	a	book.	Perhaps	it	will	have	all	been	for	nothing’.85	Over	the	course	of	1951,	Beckett	describes	his	texts	‘for	nothing’	variously	as	‘a	few	little	turds’;	‘a	whirling	dervish’;	‘little	fly-splashes	against	the	window’;	and	‘the	
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afterbirth	 of	 L’Innommable	 and	 not	 to	 be	 approached	 directly’.86	 These	 wry	formulations	offer	an	insight	into	the	status	of	the	texts	as	not	singular	or	fully-fledged	in	 their	 own	 right;	 they	 exist	 as	 excess,	waste	 and	 remains	 in	Beckett’s	mind,	 closely	related	 to	 past	 endeavours.	 For	 Louis	 Oppenheim,	 this	 intertextual	 relationship	 is	characteristic	of	Beckett’s	work	as	‘a	discourse	that	self-reflectively	focuses	on	its	own	undoing	of	narrative,	its	unwriting	of	writing	–	in	writing.	Beckett’s	creative	process	is	said	to	have	been	“decreative”	in	the	sense	that	it	was	motivated	by	the	need	to	rewrite	and	 continually	 fine	 tune	 previous	 texts	 in	 new	 ones’.87	 In	 his	 negative	 inclination	 to	‘undo’	 and	 ‘unwrite’,	 Beckett	 evokes	 an	 alternative	 vision	 of	 modernism’s	 creative	wellspring,	 which,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 also	 contains	 a	 form	 of	 neutralisation	 of	 its	productivity	in	its	resistance	to	the	past	and	insistence	on	the	immediate.	Beckett’s	 ‘decreative’	 drive	 exists	within	 single	 texts	 as	 the	 familiar	Beckettian	process	 of	 ‘unwording’,	 involving	 affirmation,	 reflection,	 revision,	 negation	 and	repetition.	 This	 process	 contributes	 to	 the	 collocation	 of	 activity	 and	 stasis	 that	constitutes	 the	vegetating	 life	 in	Beckett.	For	example,	 the	narrative	voice	 in	Texts	 for	
Nothing	utters:	‘What	variety	and	at	the	same	time	what	monotony,	how	varied	it	is	and	at	 the	 same	 time,	what’s	 the	word,	how	monotonous.	What	agitation	and	at	 the	 same	time	what	calm.	What	vicissitudes	within	what	changelessness’.88	The	narrator	achieves	the	 monotony,	 calm	 and	 changelessness	 of	 which	 he	 speaks	 by	 repeating	 a	 basic	syntactical	structure:	the	rhetorical	‘what’	in	conjunction	with	‘and	at	the	same	time’.	In	keeping,	there	are	also	permutations	of	the	core	theme	to	achieve	the	variety,	agitations	and	vicissitudes,	namely	the	use	of	‘how’	instead	of	‘what’;	the	reflection	and	hesitation	in	the	questioning	‘what’s	the	word’;	and	the	move	to	a	new	configuration	through	the	preposition	 ‘within’.	Beckett’s	narrator	does	 loosely	practice	what	he	observes	 in	 this	largely	 repetitive	 and	 yet	 refreshed	 passage,	 although,	 admittedly,	 describing	 his	
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changes	as	‘variety’	and	‘vicissitudes’	is	a	humorous	exaggeration.		Deictic	language	further	increases	the	sustainability	of	Beckett’s	‘literature	of	the	unword’.	Similar	to	the	Kafka	short	stories	discussed	above,	Beckett	draws	attention	to	the	 infinite	 present	 of	 the	 here	 and	 now,	 as	 well	 as	 highlighting	 the	 challenges	 to	immediacy	 and	 identity	 inherent	 to	 context-dependent	 language.	 Early	 in	 Texts	 for	
Nothing,	 Beckett’s	 narrator	 underlines	 the	 temporal	 and	 psychological	 aspects	 of	 his	purgatorial	condition,	although	he	sarcastically	links	them	to	a	celestial	sphere	initially:	‘And	 now	 here,	 what	 now	 here,	 one	 enormous	 second,	 as	 in	 Paradise,	 and	 the	mind	slow,	slow	nearly	stopped’.89	In	text	three,	‘Here,	depart	from	here	and	go	elsewhere,	or	stay	here,	but	coming	and	going’	is	representative	of	the	complexity	of	‘here’	in	relation	to	a	speaking	subject.90	The	first	half	indicates	that	 ‘here’,	once	uttered,	is	vacated	and	severed	from	the	subject.	It	is	originary	and	cannot	be	occupied	through	reflection.	The	second	half	indicates	that	‘here’	can	be	experienced	as	a	live	moment	but	must	remain	an	 ineffable,	 reoccurring	 activity.	 This	 combination	 of	 delay	 and	 performativity	resurfaces	when	Beckett’s	narrator	insists	‘I	say	it	as	I	hear	it’,	which	is	a	line	repeated	several	 times	 in	 Beckett’s	 later	 novel-length	 work	 How	 It	 Is	 (1964).91	 In	 an	acknowledgement	of	the	creative	process	and	the	registering	of	inspiration,	‘I	say	it	as	I	hear	it’	professes	immediacy,	like	‘here’	does,	but	it	actually	intimates	either	an	internal	dialogue	 or	 dictator-scribe	 relationship,	 in	 which	 what	 is	 thought	 or	 heard	 must	 be	computed	and	then	verbally	repeated,	thereby	resulting	in	a	minute	schism	between	the	heard	and	said.	In	Beckett,	then,	‘here’	is	purgatorial	because	it	is	transient	and	elusive;	it	is	repeatedly	voided	and	therefore	not	entirely	available	to	the	‘I’	other	than	as	a	form	of	being.	Hence,	the	narrator	says	‘I’m	here	that’s	all	I	know	and	that	it’s	still	not	me,	it’s	of	that	the	best	has	to	be	made.	There	is	no	flesh	anywhere,	nor	any	way	to	die’.92	While	the	beginning	of	this	example	is	remarkably	similar	to	the	Hunter	Gracchus’s	comment	
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‘I	am	here,	more	than	that	I	do	not	know’,	Beckett	also	conveys	the	non-identity	arising	from	the	delay	in	self-reflective	utterances,	in	which	the	acute	distance	between	‘I’	and	‘here’	reveals	the	speaker	is	inevitably	overdue	or	behind	time	in	terms	of	the	presence	afforded	by	the	first	person	pronoun	and	deictic	language.				Beckett	 is	 attracted	 to	 the	 contradiction	 in	 ‘where	 you	 are	 will	 never	 be	 long	habitable’,	which,	as	far	as	the	here	and	now	goes,	means	the	impossibility	of	realising	one’s	 self	 in	 the	moment,	 as	 opposed	 to	 experiencing	 the	 lived	moment	 itself.93	 This	revelation	 is	 evident	 in	 a	 series	 of	 remarks	 on	 the	 emptiness	 of	 the	 present,	 such	 as	‘Here,	nothing	will	happen	here,	no	one	will	be	here,	for	many	a	long	day’	and	‘how	is	it	nothing	 is	ever	here	and	now?	 […]	What	else	can	 there	be	 to	 this	 infinite	here’.94	The	present	appears	empty	because	the	gap	between	consciousness	and	self-consciousness	means	apperception	must	happen	retrospectively	and	 thus	 imperfectly.	Cognizance	of	the	present	is	actually	shown	to	be	an	exercise	in	assimilating	the	recent	past,	and	the	upshot	for	identity	in	Beckett	is	that	the	temporal	now	feels	untenanted.	Consequently,	Beckett’s	narrator	relates	with	the	singular	past	tense,	as	text	six	suggests	in	a	reference	to	 Dante’s	 Purgatorio:	 ‘I	 was,	 I	 was,	 they	 say	 in	 Purgatory,	 in	 Hell	 too’.95	 Beckett	mentions	 this	 purgatorial	 non-existence	 to	 George	 Duthuit	 in	 an	 earlier	 1948	 letter,	making	the	reference	to	Dante	more	explicit	by	using	the	original	Italian:	‘Do	you	know	the	cry	common	to	those	in	purgatory?	Io	fui’.96	In	contrast	to	the	more	unified	presence	of	 ‘I	 am’	 found	 in	 the	Cartesian	axiom	 je	pense,	donc	 je	 suis,	 the	phrase	 ‘I	was’	 reveals	that	Beckett	realises	a	Dantean	form	of	self	as	something	already	passed,	ensuring	that	the	ipseity	spoken	in	the	present,	‘I’,	has	elapsed	upon	detection,	‘was’.	If	for	Habermas,	modernity’s	‘new	value	placed	on	the	transitory,	the	elusive	and	the	ephemeral,	the	very	celebration	 of	 dynamism,	 discloses	 a	 longing	 for	 an	 undefiled,	 immaculate	 and	 stable	present’,	 Beckett	 demonstrates	 the	 impossibility	 of	 pursuing	 ‘nowness’	 as	
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uncontaminated	 immanence.97	 Through	 narrative	 figures	 riveted	 to	 self-reflection	 on	their	potential	or	pending	creation	and	desired	 termination,	Texts	 for	Nothing	 reveals	the	 unshakable	 void	 that	 coexists	 with	 attempts	 at	 the	 conscious	 representation	 of	modern	perceptions	of	subjectivity	in	time	and	space.		However,	Beckett’s	‘Dante…	Bruno.	Vico..	Joyce’	essay	discussed	earlier	indicates	that	 although	 his	 later	 narrative	 voices	might	 conceive	 of	 a	 Dantean	 purgatory,	 they	actually	suffer	a	Joycean	one.	Beckett’s	‘last	word’	on	purgatories	reads:		 Dante’s	 is	conical	and	consequently	 implies	culmination.	Mr	Joyce’s	 is	spherical	and	 excludes	 culmination.	 In	 the	 one	 there	 is	 an	 ascent	 from	 real	 vegetation	 –	Ante-Purgatory,	 to	 ideal	vegetation	–	Terrestrial	Paradise:	 in	 the	other	 there	 is	no	 ascent	 and	 no	 ideal	 vegetation.	 In	 the	 one,	 absolute	 progression	 and	 a	guaranteed	consummation;	in	the	other,	flux	–	progression	or	retrogression,	and	an	apparent	consummation.98			Dante’s	 purgatory	 posits	 an	 end,	 a	way	 out	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 spiralled	mountain	 into	Earthly	Paradise.	It	is	a	transitional	place	‘in	which	the	human	spirit	cures	itself	/	And	becomes	fit	to	leap	up	into	heaven’.99	In	contrast,	Joyce’s	purgatory	is	a	closed	system,	protean	and	provisional	inside,	but	lacking	the	prospect	of	catharsis.	As	Daniela	Caselli	explains:	 ‘Joyce’s	 and	 Dante’s	 Purgatories	 are	 similar	 because	 both	 move;	 in	 Joyce,	however,	 the	 movement	 has	 lost	 its	 redemptive	 guarantee,	 its	 fixed	 structure,	 its	character	of	space-in-between.	It	has	become	a	sphere,	a	vicious	circle	in	which	a	step	forward	 is	 a	 step	back’.100	 Yet	 the	 impetus	 to	 end,	 and,	moreover,	 to	 end	 in	 the	 right	way,	keeps	Beckett’s	narrator	going.	It	is	as	though	the	promise	of	graduation	from	real	vegetation	to	ideal	vegetation	remands	the	narrator	in	his	place	of	no	ideal	vegetation:	
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‘No,	something	better	must	be	found,	a	better	reason,	for	this	to	stop,	another	word,	a	better	idea,	to	put	in	the	negative,	a	new	no,	to	cancel	all	the	others,	all	the	old	noes	that	buried	me	down	here,	deep	in	this	place	which	is	not	one,	which	is	merely	a	moment	for	the	time	being	eternal,	which	 is	called	here’.101	Despite	being	stuck	 in	the	perdition	of	the	 deictic	 instant,	 Beckett’s	 narrator	 clings	 on	 to	 a	 form	 of	 totality	 in	 the	 way	 he	recognises	 his	 existence	 as	 a	 ‘pensum’,	 a	 task	 to	 be	 completed.102	 The	 early	 Beckett	commentator	Walter	Strauss	argues	that:		 The	 heroes	 of	 Beckett’s	 universe	 really	 vegetate,	 and,	 since	 this	 fate	 is	unendurable,	 they	 try	 to	 vegetate	 ideally,	 i.e.,	 they	 persuade	 themselves	 that	there	is	an	ascent	and	wait	for	some	sort	of	angel	to	beckon	them	on,	like	Dante's	pilgrims.	But	the	angel,	the	epiphany,	never	comes,	and	they	finally	return	to	real	vegetation.	Like	the	vegetable,	they	wilt	and	disintegrate.103			It	 is	 this	 ideal	of	 finality	 that	maintains	 the	narrator’s	 reality	of	 infinitude	 in	Texts	 for	
Nothing,	as	it	recurrently	posits	an	alternative	means	to	an	end	that	prevents	him	from	reconciling	with	his	endless	situation.	Beckett	effectively	conveys	vegetating	life	that	is	nourished	by	the	purgatorial	narratives	of	movement	and	development	but	 is	actually	rooted	in	its	cyclic	patterns,	and	therefore	relentlessly	denied	fruition.			If	the	task	is	to	produce	a	consummation	of	negation,	or	‘a	new	no’	as	Beckett’s	narrator	 expresses,	 it	 nevertheless	 requires	 vestigial	 willpower	 and	 desire.	 David	Watson	claims	that,	‘[a]t	a	primary	level,	narratives	are	about	desire:	all	stories	concern	the	drive	to	resolve	a	state	of	disruption,	discover	a	missing	object,	achieve	a	fulfilment	of	 ambition,	 and	 so	on’.104	 It	 is	 fair	 to	 claim	 that	Beckett’s	narratives	are	 replete	with	ways	in	which	such	desires	are	invalidated,	not	least	because	of	his	open,	self-cancelling	
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structures	and	provisional,	hypothetical	registers	that	repeatedly	thwart	progress	and	resolution,	 often	 at	 the	 expense	of	 individual	 autonomy.	As	Ruben	Borg	 argues	 in	his	essay	 on	 Beckettian	 afterlife	 and	 the	 posthuman,	 Beckett	 is	 ‘staging	 the	 exhausted,	impracticable	 afterlife	 of	 that	 enduring	 Enlightenment	 ideal—the	 self-determined	subject’,	in	which	‘the	sense	of	being	not	only	mortal,	but	in	excess	of	one’s	own	death,	corresponds	 to	 a	 state	of	 infinite	 passivity—precisely	 that	 “limbo	purged	of	 desire”	 in	which	 Beckett’s	 characters	 are	 always	 suspended’.105	 Borg	 extrapolates	 this	 principle	from	Belacqua	Shuah	 in	Beckett’s	Dream	of	Fair	 to	Middling	Women	(1932),	who,	 like	Murphy,	is	able	to	access	parts	of	the	mind	he	calls	‘the	cup,	the	umbra,	the	tunnel’	for	months	at	a	time,	‘where	there	was	no	conflict	of	flight	and	flow	and	Eros	was	as	null	as	Anteros’.106	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	while	Belacqua	is	‘uniquely	at	home	in	the	middle-ground’	of	passivity	and	 ‘is	 in	no	hurry	to	be	redeemed’,	even	his	purgation	of	desire	 is	 temporary	and	 incomplete.107	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	completely	expunge	desire	in	Beckett’s	world,	precisely	because	Beckettian	vegetative	life	is	often	a	product	of	 the	unfulfilled	desire	 for	 such	 indifference,	which	 is	what	makes	 it	both	active	and	static.	 As	 with	 Kafka’s	 self-denial	 that	 reinforces	 the	 self	 that	 it	 effaces,	 and	 akin	 to	Beckett’s	narrators’	urges	to	speak	into	silence,	the	desire	for	apathy	is	another	example	of	 aporia	 as	 it	must	ultimately	use	what	 it	wants	 to	negate.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 resulting	vegetating	 life	 is	 not	 another	 path	 to	 the	 contented	 equilibrium	 implied	 in	 Beckett’s	reading	of	Dante,	despite	resorting	to	a	Dantean	quest	structure	that	projects	an	end.	As	Alistair	Morgan	suggests:	‘the	figure	of	exhaustion	in	Beckett	precludes	a	time	of	peace	or	rest.	The	point	at	which	the	end	comes	becomes	an	endlessly	vanishing	moment’.108	Desire	 emerges	 as	 a	 revenant	 in	 Beckett,	 the	 hardy	 but	 hollow	 leftover	 of	 genuine	possibility	that	nevertheless	continues	to	propel	his	shattered	subjects.	Whether	 the	 residual	 desire	 in	 Beckett’s	 work	 produces	 the	 invigorating	
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differences	 of	 renewal	 or	 stultifying	 sameness	 of	 repetition	 is	 a	 critical	 point	 of	contention	when	regarding	Beckett	as	a	late	modernist.	H.	Porter	Abbott	suggests	that	Beckett’s	centre	of	gravity	is	in	modernism,	precisely	owing	to	a	spirit	of	opposition	that	runs	 through	 his	 whole	 oeuvre,	 from	 text	 to	 text	 and	 within	 texts.	 He	 argues	 that	Beckett	 affords	 himself	 new	 creative	 opportunities	 through	 a	 ‘deliberate	 process	 of	recollection	 by	 distortion',	 which	 produces	 ‘deliberate	 metamorphosis,	 a	 kind	 of	misremembering’.109	As	Beckett	 revisits	 and	 crucially	 revises	previous	 territory,	 he	 is	‘recapitulating	 an	 antagonism	 to	 habit	 one	 can	 trace	 well	 back	 in	 Baudelairean	modernité’.110	 In	Porter	Abbott’s	reading,	Beckett	retains	the	experimental,	 innovative	modernist	status,	albeit,	a	late	modernist	status	since,	after	the	initial	aesthetic	shocks	of	the	post-war	period,	Beckett’s	oeuvre	displayed	more	constrained	innovations.	Mark	Perdetti,	 however,	 argues	 that	 Beckett’s	 is	 a	 knowing	 modernism,	 which	 upsets	 the	dominance	of	the	modernist	gravity	that	Porter	Abbott	identifies.	For	Perdetti,	Beckett’s	‘self-awareness	 represents	 a	 fundamental	 inversion	 of	 the	 modernist	 ideology	 of	perpetual	innovation:	instead	of	novelty,	late	modernism	presents	us	with	the	tedium	of	the	 already-said’.111	 The	 impetus	 of	 the	 oppositional	 spirit	 has	 seemingly	 been	exhausted	 in	 this	 view,	 and	 ‘[i]n	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 alternative	 aesthetic,	 the	 late	modernist	 writer	 is	 condemned	 to	 occupy	 that	 limit	 position,	 and	 to	 write	 from	 its	weariness’.112	Perdetti	 raises	 the	 idea	of	Beckett	 in	an	artistic	no-man’s	 land	between	modernism	 and	 postmodernism,	 having	 to	 perform	 an	 inauthentic	 rendition	 of	 an	expiring	 aesthetic.	 In	 conjunction,	 however,	 the	 genuine	 development	 and	 the	 ironic	reiteration	in	Porter	Abbott’s	and	Perdetti’s	respective	analyses	show	that	Beckett	gives	off	the	impression	of	both	resuming	modernism,	as	an	ongoing	resistance	to	the	same,	as	 well	 as	 consciously	 returning	 to	modernism,	 as	 a	 jaded,	 anterior	 form	without	 an	established	 successor.	Beckett’s	work	 can	 support	 both	of	 these	positions	because	he	
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conveys	 the	 enlivening-deadening	 duality	 of	 vegetating	 life	 that	 already	 exists	 in	 the	auto-defeating	 and	 auto-sustaining	 spirit	 of	 modernism,	 especially	 as	 perceptions	 of	modernism’s	dynamism	mature	to	detect	restless	stasis	and	nostalgia	for	productivity.	Beckett’s	 late	 modernism	 is	 therefore	 with	 and	 without	 modernism:	 the	experimentation	 involved	 in	 excavating	 the	 modernist	 ruins	 of	 originality	 and	immediacy,	as	well	as	its	narratives	of	individual	subjectivity	and	the	idea	of	progress,	appears	to	bear	its	spiritual	hallmark	while	bearing	witness	to	its	ideological	demise.		
Conclusion:	The	Late	Modernist	Execution	of	Modernism	The	vegetating	life	in	Kafka	and	Beckett	is	a	compulsion	to	be	active	while	anchored	in	a	spatial	 and	 temporal	present	 that	 inhibits	 salvation	or	 totality.	 Critical	 orthodox	after	Benjamin,	 Lukács	 and	 Adorno	 is	 to	 relate	 these	 purgatorial	 conditions	 to	 the	dehumanising	 forces	 of	 industry,	 technology,	 urbanity	 and	 war	 in	 early	 twentieth-century	modernity	or	the	decay	of	culture,	experience	and	subjectivity	in	the	damaged	life	 of	 post-Holocaust	 later	 modernity.	 However,	 vegetative	 life	 also	 chimes	 with	 the	dynamics	 of	modernism	 as	 a	 sensibility,	 particularly	 the	 duality	 that	 emerges	 from	 a	conception	of	modernism	as	an	unfulfilled	spirit	 consisting	of	compulsive	activity	and	overall	 inertia.	As	with	deictic	 language,	however,	the	value	of	modernism’s	pursuit	of	the	now	and	the	new	is	a	matter	of	perception,	as	it	can	present	both	infinite	potential	and	 endless	 emptiness.	Kafka	 and	Beckett	 are	 receptive	 to	 the	 latter	 cycle	 of	 attempt	without	 prospect,	 and	 subsequently	 their	 modernist	 life	 spirit	 shifts	 to	 a	 negative	teleological	 or	 eschatological	 project	 to	 terminate	 itself,	 whereby	 the	 effort	 invested	into	 ending	 is	 ironically	 the	 cause	 of	 its	 continuation.	 Kafka’s	 prescient	 literature	forecasts	 the	 later	 application	 of	 modernism’s	 vestigial	 spirit	 to	 pore	 over	 its	 own	remains,	 in	 the	way	Beckett’s	 post-war	 art	 of	 failure	does	 so	 assiduously.	 The	 lack	of	
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authentic	or	original	life	that	this	vegetating	life	implies	is	properly	associated	with	late	modernism,	 if	 understood	as	 a	designation	 that	 covers	 ‘the	 empty	 spaces	 left	 by	high	modernism’s	 dissolution’	 in	 which	 ‘late	 modernists	 reassembled	 fragments	 into	disfigured	 likenesses	 of	 modernist	 masterpieces:	 the	 unlovely	 allegories	 of	 a	 world’s	end’.113	 Despite	 his	 narrow	 periodization	 of	 late	modernism	 as	 the	 late	 1920s	 to	 the	1930s,	Tyrus	Miller	 recognises	 the	 important	point	 that	 ‘in	 such	works	 the	vectors	of	despair	and	utopia,	the	compulsion	to	decline	and	the	impulse	to	renewal,	are	not	just	related;	they	are	practically	indistinguishable’.114	Late	modernism	therefore	formalises	the	abortive	but	enduring	kernel	that	exists	within	the	spirit	of	modernism;	it	enacts	the	chronic	 belatedness	 and	 persistence	 endemic	 to	 its	 oppositional,	 experimental	forbearer.	 Kafka	 and	 Beckett	 invoke	 and	 perform	 this	 sense	 of	 protracted	 failure	present	in	their	own	supposed	modernist	artistic	sensibility	to	expose	the	burdensome,	atrophied	side	of	 its	dynamism.	In	doing	so,	these	two	writers	effectively	 ‘execute’	the	spirit	 of	modernism	 as	 they	 are	 both	 engaged	with	 and	 consciously	 going	 beyond	 it.	Subject	 to	 the	 frisson	 of	 the	 creative	 process	 but	 without	 convincing	 progression,	Kafka’s	and	Beckett’s	vegetating	figures	are	emblematic	of	late	modernism,	lingering	on	the	loss	and	possible	renewal	of	self,	community	and	meaning,	but	from	a	greater	self-reflective	position	of	dejection	and	incredulity.																																																															1	Shane	Weller,	‘Performing	the	Negative:	Kafka	and	the	Origins	of	Late	Modernism’,	The	Modern	
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